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Termination of Life-Prolonging Medical
Treatment: An Analysis of Pennsylvania's
Proposed Medical Treatment Decision Act
Kahn was asleep that night when I stopped in for an eve-
ning check. The room was still save for the beep-beep of the
[cardiac] monitor, the rhythmic woosh of the ventilator and the
hum of the nasogastric suction apparatus. And Kahn looked
suddenly so very old and frail, lost among tubes and wires and
enormous imposing machines . . . I checked the settings on
the ventilator and slipped out of the room. Sometime late that
night, Kahn woke up, reached over and switched off his ventila-
tor. The nurses didn't find him for several hours. They called me
to pronounce him dead. The room was silent when I entered.
The ventilator issued no rush of air, the monitor tracked a
straight line, the suction machine was shut off. Kahn lay abso-
lutely still. On the bedside table I found a note, scrawled in
Kahn's uneven hand: "Death is not the enemy, doctor. Inhuman-
ity is."
I. Introduction
The advent of life-prolonging medical technology raises complex
legal issues surrounding the treatment of patients suffering from in-
curable or irreversible conditions. Court intervention in the medical
treatment decisionmaking process has been necessary in order to ab-
solve hospitals, doctors, and nursing homes from potential criminal,
1. Caroline, M.D., Do Doctors Know the Real Enemy?, reprinted by Concern for Dying,
250 West 57th Street, New York, New York 10107 with permission from NEW PHYSICIAN
(Journal of the American Medical Student Association).
2. For cases involving criminal liability, see Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d
1127, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1986); Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal.
Rptr. 484 (1983); People v. Mitchell, 132 Cal. App. 3d 389, 183 Cal. Rptr. 166 (1982);
Parker v. United States, 406 A.2d 1275 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Commonwealth v. Golston, 373
Mass. 249, 366 N.E.2d 744 (1977) cert. denied 434 U.S. 1039 (1978); State v. Johnson, 60
Ohio 2d 45, 395 N.E.2d 368 (1977). In Barber, a physician was charged with conspiracy to
commit murder and murder, following his disconnection of a respirator and intravenous feed-
ing device at the request of the family of an irreversibly unconscious patient. The California
Court of Appeals reversed the Superior Court's declaration that the physician must stand trial
for murder. It stated that ". . . it appears to us that a murder prosecution is a poor way to
design an ethical and moral code for doctors who are faced with decisions concerning the use
of costly and extraordinary 'life-support' equipment." Barker, 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1011, 195
Cal. Rptr. at 486. See generally Oakes, Criminal Liability in Treatment of Irreversibly Co-
matose Patients, 7 L.A. LAWYER 35 (May 1984).
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or civil liability when the termination of life-support systems is re-
quested.3 Likewise, court intervention has been sought in order to
protect a patient's right to die a natural death in a hospital which
seeks to discharge him because he has refused treatment." In re-
sponse to these issues, numerous state legislatures have enacted laws5
protecting the right of terminally ill patients to refuse life-prolonging
treatment for incurable diseases. Currently, thirty-nine states have
passed living will legislation. 6
3. In the absence of legislation, New Jersey is one jurisdiction that has developed an
extensive body of case law to guide hospitals, doctors, patients, and families in a wide range of
treatment situations. In re Farrell, 108 N.J. 335, 529 A.2d 404 (1987) (husband filed com-
plaint seeking appointment as special medical guardian with specific authority to remove respi-
rator from competent, terminally ill wife living at home); In re Jobes, 108 N.J. 394, 529 A.2d
434 (1987) (husband sued seeking withdrawal of a jejunostomy tube from non-elderly wife in
a persistent vegetative state when nursing home refused request for removal); In re Peter, 108
N.J. 365, 529 A.2d 419 (1987) (surrogate decisionmaker authorized by power of attorney filed
complaint seeking removal of nasogastric tube from comatose patient in a persistent vegetative
state); In re Requena, 213 N.J. Super. 475, 517 A.2d 886 (1986) (hospital brought action to
compel competent, terminally ill patient to leave hospital when she refused to accept feeding
by a nasogastric tube or other artificial device); In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209
(1985) (guardian of incompetent elderly nursing home resident sought removal of nasogastric
feeding tube); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922
(1976) (father sought court order to direct removal of respirator from comatose daughter in a
"chronic persistent vegetative state").
4. Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1986) (compe-
tent, non-elderly, cerebral palsy victim sought injunction prohibiting hospital from force-feed-
ing her or transferring her to another facility against her will); In re Requena, 213 N.J. Super.
475, 517 A.2d 886 (1986).
5. A variety of terms are used when referring to essentially the same type of legislative
enactments. The following terms are used interchangeably throughout this Comment: Living
Will Laws, Natural Death Acts, Death with Dignity Acts, Right-to-Die Laws.
6. SOCIETY FOR THE RIGHT TO DIE, HANDBOOK OF LIVING WILL LAWS 28-29 (1987)
[hereinafter 1987 HANDBOOK]. The following is a list of statutory citations for all living will
laws enacted to date: Alabama Natural Death Act (enacted 1981) ALA. CODE §§ 22-8A- I to -
10 (1984); Alaska Rights of Terminally Ill Act (1986) ALASKA STAT. §§ 18.12.010 to -. 100
(Supp. 1986); Arizona Medical Treatment Decision Act (1985) ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-
3201 to -3210 (1986). Arkansas Rights of the Terminally Ill or Permanently Unconscious Act
(1987) 1987 ARK. ACTS 713 (replacing Arkansas Act of 1977); California Natural Death Act
(1976) CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7185-7195 (West Supp. 1988); Colorado Medical
Treatment Decision Act (1985) COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 15-18-101 to -113 (Supp. 1986); Con-
necticut Removal of Life Support Systems Act (1985) CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 19a-570 to -575
(1987); Delaware Death with Dignity Act (1982) DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 2501-2509
(1983). District of Columbia Natural Death Act of 1981 (1982), D.C. CODE ANN.
§§ 6-2421 to -2430 (Supp. 1986); Florida Life-Prolonging Procedure Act (1984) FLA. STAT.
ANN. §§ 765.01 to -. 15 (West 1986); Georgia Living Wills Act (1984, 1986, 1987) GA. CODE
ANN. §§ 88-4101 to -4112 (1986 & Supp. 1987) (amended 1987 Ga. Laws 488); Hawaii
Medical Treatment Decisions Act (1986) HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 327d-I to -27 (Supp. 1986)
Idaho Natural Death Act (1977, 1986) IDAHO CODE §§ 39-4501 to -4508 (1985 & Supp.
1987); Illinois Living Will Act (1984) ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/ §§ 701-710 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1987); Indiana Living Wills and Life-Prolonging Procedures Act (1985) IND. CODE
ANN. §§ 16-8-11-1 to -17 (Burns Supp. 1987) Iowa Life-Sustaining Procedures Act (1985,
1987) IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 144A.1 to -. 11 (West Supp. 1987) (amended H.R. 360, 1987
session, 72d Iowa General Assembly); Kansas Natural Death Act (1979) KAN. STAT. ANN. §§
65-28, 101 to -28, 120 (1985); Louisiana Life-Sustaining Procedures Act (1984, 1985) LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:1299.58.1 to -. 10 (West Supp. 1987); Maine Living Wills Act (1985)
TERMINATION OF MEDICAL TREATMENT
Pennsylvania's first "right-to-die" decision was handed down by
the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas on August 26,
1987.1 In the absence of legislative guidance, Judge Samuel Lehrer
relied on the common law doctrine of self-determination and the
constitutional right of privacy in granting the request of a compe-
tent, terminally ill woman to have a mechanical respirator removed.8
The Pennsylvania General Assembly is currently considering a bill
entitled the Medical Treatment Decision Act9 which is intended to
facilitate medical treatment decisionmaking. It allows a competent
adult to execute a written declaration indicating to the physician his
or her treatment desires in the event of terminal illness or incompe-
tency. 10 These statutory procedures provide an alternative to judicial
reliance on constitutional and common law doctrines fraught with
ambiguity and contradiction.
The purpose of this Comment is two-fold. First, it examines the
judicial response to problems posed by medical treatment decision-
making for patients with incurable or irreversible conditions. Then it
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 2921-2931 (Supp. 1987); Maryland Life-Sustaining Proce-
dures Act (1985, 1986) MD. HEALTH-GENERAL CODE ANN. §§ 5-601 to -614 (Supp 1987);
Mississippi Withdrawal of Life-Saving Mechanisms Act (1984) Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 41-41-
101 to -121 (Supp. 1987); Missouri Life Support Declaration Act (1985), Mo. ANN. STAT. §§
459.010 to .055 (Vernon Supp. 1988); Montana Living Will Act (1985) MONT. CODE ANN. §§
50-9-191 to -104, -I11, -201 to -206 (1987); Nevada Withholding or Withdrawal of Life-
Sustaining Procedures Act (1977) NEv. REV. STAT. §§ 449.540 to -.690 (1986); New Hamp-
shire Terminal Care Document Act (1985) N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 137-H:1 to H:16 (Supp.
1987); New Mexico Right to Die Act (1977, 1984) N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-7-1 to -11 (1986);
North Carolina Right to Natural Death Act (1977, 1979, 1981, 1983) N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 90-320 to -322 (1985); Oklahoma Natural Death Act (1985); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §§
3101-3111 (West Supp. 1988); Oregon Rights with Respect to Terminal Illness Act (1977,
1983) OR. REV. STAT. §§ 97.050 to -.090 (1987); South Carolina Death with Dignity Act
(1986) S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-77-10 to -160 (Law. Co-op Supp. 1987); Tennessee Right to
Natural Death Act (1985) TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 32-11-101 to -110 (Supp. 1987); Texas Nat-
ural Death Act (1977, 1979, 1983, 1985) TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4590h (Vernon
Supp. 1986); Utah Personal Choice and Living Will Act (1985) UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 75-2-
1101 to -1118 (Supp. 1987); Vermont Terminal Care Document Act (1982) VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 18, §§ 5251-5262 and tit. 13, 1801 (Supp. 1987); Virginia Natural Death Act (1983) VA.
CODE §§ 54-325.8:1 to - :13 (Supp. 1987); Washington Natural Death Act (1979) WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 70.122.010 to -.905 (Supp. 1987); West Virginia Natural Death Act
(1984) W. VA. CODE §§ 16-30-1 to -10 (1985); Wisconsin Natural Death Act (1984, 1986)
WIsc. STAT. ANN. §§ 154.01 to -. 15 (West Supp. 1987); Wyoming Act (1984) WYO. STAT. §§
35-22-101 to -109 (Supp. 1987).
7. In re Jane Doe, No. 2560 (Pa. C.P. Philadelphia County Aug. 26, 1987).
8. Id. at 29.
9. S.B. 210, Pennsylvania General Assembly, 1987 Sess.
10. The bill was passed as amended on third consideration in the Senate on April 28,
1987 by a 43-6 vote. An itemization of the amendments suggested by Senators Stauffer and
Greenwood which were made to the original bill is found in the PA. LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL-
SENATE at 445-46, April 1987. For a history of consideration of the bill see COMBINED His-
TORY OF SENATE AND HOUSE BILLS, Sessions of 1987 and 1988, S.B. 210, Pennsylvania Gen-
eral Assembly A-26 (1988).
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examines legislative enactments with a primary focus on Pennsylva-
nia's proposed Medical Treatment Decision Act. Because resolution
of the issues raised in determining when treatment should or should
not be continued is cumbersome for the courts, it is essential that
statutory enactments be comprehensive and well-drafted. An analy-
sis of Pennsylvania's proposed statute in comparison with those of
other jurisdictions is necessary to ensure that an effective means for
making medical treatment decisions is achieved.
II. Historical Development
Voluntary termination of life-support systems conflicts with two
principles firmly established in society: 1) the goal of the medical
profession to preserve life; and 2) the legal prohibitions against any
affirmative act that causes death to a human being." Doctors trained
in the Hippocratic tradition are required to swear that they will
neither give a deadly drug to anyone if asked nor make any sugges-
tion to that effect.'
2
Despite this conflict with well-established principles, natural
death legislation appeared in the United States as early as 1938.'"
At that time, the Euthanasia Society of America advocated legisla-
tion which permitted the involuntary euthanasia of incompetent peo-
ple.'4 The first right-to-die bill emerged in Nebraska 15 followed by
one in New York. 6 These bills were modeled after British laws
which provided that a patient who was over twenty-one years of age
and suffering from a terminal illness could, in the presence of two
witnesses, sign a form asking to be killed.'
The first enactment of right-to-die legislation did not occur in
the United States until 1976 when California passed its Natural
11. See Comment, The Right to Die a Natural Death and the Living Will, 13 TEX.
TECH. L. REV. 99, 100 (1982).
12. C. CHAPMAN, PHYSICIANS, LAW, AND ETHICS, 22 (1984). More than one version of
the Hippocratic Oath exists. Two different versions provide as follows: "l will apply dietetic
measures for the benefit of the sick according to my ability and judgment; I will keep them
from harm and injustice. I will neither give a deadly drug to anybody if asked for it, nor will I
make a suggestion to this effect." Id. "I will follow that method of treatment which, according
to my ability and judgment, I consider for the benefit of my patients, and abstain from
whatever is deleterious and mischievous. I will give no deadly medicine to anyone if asked, nor
suggest such counsel. ... See Comment, supra note II, at 100 n.6.
13. Comment, supra note I1, at I ll.
14. Id.
15. L.B. 135, 52d Sess., Neb. Legislature (1937). See Survey, Euthanasia: Criminal,
Tort, Constitutional and Legislative Considerations, 48 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 1202, 1253
n.432 (1973).
16. Survey, supra note 15, at 1253.
17. Comment, supra note II, at 110-1I1.
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Death Act. 18 The earlier versions proposed in Nebraska and New
York recognized an individual's right to control the course of his or
her medical treatment, yet they appeared to suggest a form of active
euthanasia.19 With the development of medical technology, however,
the issue evolved from that of sanctioning the administration of af-
firmative acts which cause death20 to one of artificially prolonging
the life of a patient against his or her will.
21
In the absence of legislation, the right-to-die issue has evolved
in a similar manner through judicial decision. Originally, medical
and ethical standards justified removal of life-support technology
only after the patient was declared "brain dead."22 The common
law, however, has traditionally recognized and protected the con-
cepts of human autonomy and self-determination. These concepts
were originally articulated by Cardozo in an early battery case when
he stated "[elvery human being of adult years and sound mind has
the right to determine what shall be done with his own body
"23
The principles of human autonomy and self-determination en-
compass a person's right to terminate unwanted medical treatment.
This right derives from the common law doctrine of informed con-
sent. 24 According to the doctrine of informed consent, a doctor has a
legal duty to disclose to his patient the known dangers associated
with proposed medical treatment, and failure to do so constitutes
18. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7185-7195 (West Supp. 1988).
19. The term euthanasia originated from the following Greek roots: eu (easy, happy,
painless) and thanatos (death). It first appeared in the English language in the early seven-
teenth century, and meant a gentle, easy death. Kamisar, Some Non-Religious Views Against
Proposed "Mercy-Killing" Legislation, 42 MINN. L. REV. 969, n.3 (1958).
20. The active/passive distinction has been criticized on the basis that it is purely an
emotional distinction without substance. One commentator suggests that the passive euthana-
sia approach is counterproductive to the goal of alleviating suffering because often a physician
could perform a simple affirmative act which would euthanize the patient with much less pain.
Therefore, it is predicted that when the passive approach becomes obsolete, societal acceptance
of active euthanasia will occur. Gelfand. Euthanasia and the Terminally Ill Patient, 63 NEB.
L. REV. 741, 753-54 (1984).
21. Antidysthanasia, referring to "passive" euthanasia, is a new term that has begun to
appear in the literature. It includes the notion of withdrawing technologically-advanced life-
support systems. See Gelfand, supra note 20, at 754 n.61.
22. Brain death is defined as the complete cessation of brain activity. See Comment,
Right to Die: A Survey of Legislative and Judicial Responses to Life-Support Technology, 5
GLENDALE L. REV. 188, 200 (1984). In the well-publicized Quinlan case, the doctor initially
refused the father's request to remove his daughter's respirator on the grounds that she was
not brain dead. Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 28, 355 A.2d at 656-57, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
23. Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914).
24. For a detailed listing of decisions involving informed consent see Martyn and Jacobs,
Legislating Advance Directives for the Terminally Ill: The Living Will and Durable Power of
Attorney, 63 NEB. L. REV. 779, 781 n.12 (1984).
92 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW SUMMER 1988
negligence.2 5 Proceeding in the absence of disclosure renders a physi-
cian liable for assault and battery.2"
Analytically, the difference between the doctrine of informed
consent and the right-to-die issue is that in the former the patient
refuses treatment in order to avoid the risk of death, while in the
latter treatment is refused in order to allow death to occur. Provided
that the decision to die naturally is made by the patient and not the
physician, liability for assault and battery could similarly arise if
medical treatment is administered contrary to a patient's will for the
purpose of artificially prolonging life.
Courts have also located the right to choose a natural death
within the constitutional right to privacy.2 Reliance on the privacy
theory can be traced to a 1964 case28 in the District of Columbia
Circuit Court of Appeals wherein Judge Burger argued in a dissent-
ing opinion that the refusal of ordinary medical treatment which
would otherwise save a patient's life is justified by the right to pri-
vacy. Subsequently, In re Quinlan9 was the first significant adjudi-
cation to permit, on privacy grounds, the termination of extraordi-
nary medical treatment in the case of an irreversibly comatose
patient.
Judicial reliance on the constitutional right to privacy as a justi-
fication for the refusal of medical treatment poses an inherent diffi-
culty given the elusive nature of the right and its uncertain applica-
25. Trogun v. Fruchtman, 58 Wis. 2d 596, 597-98, 207 N.W. 2d 297, 312-13 (1973).
26. Scott v. Wilson, 396 S.W.2d 532, 535 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965) aft'd 412 S.W.2d 299
(Tex. 1967).
27. The right to privacy doctrine as a justification for refusal or withdrawal of medical
treatment has been asserted by courts in the following cases: Foody v. Manchester Memorial
Hosp., 40 Conn. Supp. 127, 482 A.2d 713 (1984); Severns v. Wilmington Medical Center, 421
A.2d 1334 (Del. 1980); Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So.2d 160 (Fla. App. 1978); Lane v. Candura,
6 Mass. App. Ct. 377, 376 N.E.2d 1232 (1978); Superintendent of Belchertown State School
v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977); In re Farrell, 108 N.J. 335, 529 A.2d
404 (1987); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922
(1976); In re Jane Doe, No. 2560 (Pa. C.P. Philadelphia County August 26, 1987); In re
Maida Yetter, 62 D. & C. 2d 619 (Pa. C.P. Northampton County 1973).
28. In re President and Directors of Georgetown College, 331 F.2d 1010, 1016-17 (D.C.
Cir. 1964) (Burger, J. dissenting) cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964).
29. 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1975), cert. denied 492 U.S. 922 (1976). The analytical
framework employed in Quinlan has been sharply criticized by at least one commentator who
identified three "weak links" in the chain of analysis. First, it is suggested that in light of John
F. Kennedy Memorial Hospital v. Heston, 58 N.J. 576, 279 A.2d 670 (1971), the New Jersey
Supreme Court was precluded by precedent from allowing termination of the respirator based
on a constitutional right to privacy. Second, assuming that the right to privacy does exist, it
belongs to the individual alone (Karen Quinlan) and may not be transferred to another who
makes decisions for that individual. Even worse, a decision based on the right to privacy can-
not be made by "popular election" which is, in effect, what happened when the Quinlan court
appointed the patient's family, the physician, and the hospital ethics committee to exercise
Karen Quinlan's right to privacy. See Gelfan, supra note 20, at 745-48.
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tion.so As a result, the New York Court of Appeals has specifically
refused to address the privacy issue in right-to-die cases because it
remains a disputed question.3 1 Likewise, in a case involving the re-
fusal of blood transfusions on religious grounds, the New Jersey Su-
preme Court held that "there is no constitutional right to choose to
die."" Neither the common law doctrine of self-determination nor
the constitutional right to privacy provide courts with clear authority
for recognizing a right to refuse life-prolonging medical treatment.
Therefore, legislative articulation of guidelines is essential in order to
establish procedures which will assist in the medical treatment deci-
sionmaking process.33
III. Judicial Treatment of the Issue
A. Decisionmaking for Competent Patients
Over a decade ago in In re Maida Yetter,34 a Pennsylvania
court upheld a patient's right to refuse ordinary3 5 medical treatment
30. The difficulty in applying the constitutional right of privacy in the context of right-
to-die cases raises problems similar to those surrounding the abortion controversy. In Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), the Supreme Court upheld a woman's right to decide whether to
terminate pregnancy based on her constitutional right to privacy. The Court found that right
to privacy within the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty. Id. at 153. There
has, however, been substantial criticism of the analytical framework employed in Roe. See
generally Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf.- A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920
(1973).
31. Eichner v. Dillon, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266 (1981). (The
court based its decision, allowing removal of a respirator from a patient in a permanently
vegetative state, on the individual's common law right to refuse treatment and called for clear
and convincing evidence of the patient's prior expression of intent.) See also Comment, supra
note I1, at 108-09.
32. John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Heston, 58 N.J. 576, 580, 279 A.2d 670, 672
(1971).
33. The Committee for Pro-Life Activities of the National Conference of Catholic Bish-
ops recognized that states without legislation were having problems that were being handled
by the courts which often produced opinions they found to be "odious." As a result, the church
reversed its original position opposing legislation on the grounds that it might be a first step
toward permitting more active euthanasia and published a set of guidelines setting forth provi-
sions that local officials should attempt to include in living will legislation. See The Wall Street
Journal, July 2, 1985, at -, col. 1.
34. 62 D. & C. 2d 619 (Pa. C.P. Northampton County 1973) (sixty-year-old woman
refused diagnostic and corrective surgery for breast cancer. Court stated that the right of
privacy includes a right to die with which the state should not interfere when there are no
minor or unborn children and no clear and present danger to public health, welfare, or
morals).
35. Pope Pius XII distinguished between "ordinary" and "extraordinary" means used to
prolong the life of a dying patient in a 1957 address. He stated as follows:
"Natural reason and Christian morals say that man (and whoever is en-
trusted with taking care of his fellowman) has the right and the duty in case of
serious illness to take the necessary treatment for the preservation of life and
health.
"But normally one is held to use only ordinary means - according to the
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on privacy grounds. Yet, the right to remove technologically-ad-
vanced treatment 6 from a competent, terminally ill patient, was not
addressed by the Pennsylvania courts until August 1987. In a case of
first impression, In re Jane Doe," the Court of Common Pleas of
Philadelphia County extended the right to reject ordinary medical
treatment articulated in Yetter"8 to include a concomitant right to
discontinue or withdraw mechanical, life-sustaining medical
treatment.3 9
The Doe court recognized that a person's right to discontinue
life-prolonging measures is not absolute, but is subject to four state
interests: 1) the preservation of life, 2) the interests of innocent third
parties such as dependent minors, 3) the prevention of suicide; and
4) the maintenance of the integrity and ethics of the medical profes-
sion. 0 It then performed a balancing test and concluded that "[t]he
state's interest in the preservation of life weakens and the individ-
ual's right to privacy grows as the degree of bodily invasion increases
and the prognosis dims.""1 Using this analysis, the court held that
the patient's right to self-determination and privacy outweighed any
circumstances of persons, places, time and culture - that is to say, means that
do not involve any grave burden for oneself or another. A more strict obligation
would be too burdensome for most men and would render the attainment of the
higher, more important good too difficult.
"Life, health, all temporal activities are in fact subordinated to spiritual
ends."
See J. MCCARTNEY, CATHOLIC POSITIONS ON WITHHOLDING SUSTENANCE FOR THE TERMI-
NALLY ILL, (1986) reprinted by The Catholic Health Association of the United States, with
permission from Health Progress (citing Pope Pius XII, Alloution 'Le Dr. Bruno Haid'. Acta
Apostolicae Sedis, Nov. 24, 1957, at 1031-1032.).
36. One critic has questioned the distinction between ordinary measures and heroic mea-
sures on the grounds that today's heroic measures will be tomorrow's ordinary measures as
society adjusts to technological advances. For this reason, it is argued that the distinction is
meaningless because it can never have a fixed meaning in the rapidly changing sequence of
technological progress. See Gelfand, supra note 20, at 754-55.
37. No. 2560 (Pa. C.P. Philadelphia County Aug. 26, 1987).
38. 62 D. & C. 2d 619 (Pa. C.P. Northampton County 1972).
39. In re Jane Doe, No. 2560, slip op. at 19-20 (Pa. C.P. Philadelphia County Aug. 26,
1987).
40. Id. at 20-21. Cases upholding the state's interest in preserving or sustaining life over
the treatment desires of the patient involve the refusal of medical treatment on religious
grounds in emergency situations. See. e.g., In re President and Directors of Georgetown Col-
lege, 331 F.2d 1010 (D.C. Cir. 1964) cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964) (state interest in
protecting innocent minor child overrode Jehovah Witness's refusal of blood transfusion on
religious grounds); In re Estate of Dorone, 349 Pa. Super. 59, 502 A.2d 1271 (1985) (court
declined to appoint parents of twenty-two-year-old accident victim as temporary guardian
when it knew they would refuse to give consent to blood transfusion because of religious be-
liefs). But cf. Commonwealth v. Konz, 498 Pa. 639, 450 A.2d 638 (1982) (court reversed
wife's conviction of involuntary manslaughter finding no duty to seek medical aid for diabetic
husband who competently chose to forego insulin treatment because of religious beliefs).
41. In re Jane Doe, No. 2560, slip. op. at 23 (Pa. C.P. Philadelphia County Aug. 26,
1987).
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countervailing state interest.
A situation nearly identical to that presented by In re Jane Doe
was recently brought before the New Jersey Supreme Court in In re
Farrell."2 Both Kathleen Farrell and the patient in Doe were compe-
tent patients suffering from Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis (ALS)"
who petitioned the courts for permission to remove their mechanical
respirators. Kathleen Farrell lived at home while the Doe patient
was hospitalized at the time of her request. In Farrell, the court
considered the interests of Ms. Farrell's two minor children and
found that the children's interests did not outweigh their mother's
right to self-determination and privacy."" As illustrated by both of
these cases, however, courts may refuse to allow the termination of
life-sustaining equipment when innocent third parties may be
harmed by the patient's decision.""
B. Decisionmaking for Incompetent Patients
Decisions to terminate life-support systems are further compli-
cated when the patient is incompetent and unable to articulate his or
her treatment desires. When a request is made to terminate medical
treatment on behalf of an incompetent patient, courts employ a sub-
stituted judgment standard to determine, as nearly as possible, what
the patient's desires would be if the patient were competent. The
substituted judgment doctrine was applied by the Supreme Court of
Massachusetts in Superintendent of Belchertown State School v.
Saikewicz."I In that case, the court allowed the guardian ad litem of
a sixty-seven year old mentally retarded man, who was suffering
from leukemia, to refuse chemotherapy on behalf of his ward. Testi-
42. 108 N.J. 335, 529 A.2d 404 (1987). This is one of three cases decided on the same
day by the New Jersey Supreme Court involving the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment
from patients suffering from incurable and irreversible medical conditions. The other two cases
address treatment decisions for patients in persistent vegetative states. See In re Jobes, 108
N.J. 394, 529 A.2d 434 (1987); In re Peter, 108 N.J. 365, 529 A.2d 419 (1987).
43. ALS is a degenerative disease affecting nerve function which, in the later stages,
requires dependency on a nasogastric feeding tube and a ventilator. It is commonly referred to
as Lou Gehrig's disease.
44. 108 N.J. at __ , 529 A.2d at 412-13 (1987). Kathleen Farrell died on June 29,
1986 while still connected to the respirator. Nevertheless, the court agreed to render a decision
on the merits because of the extreme importance of the issue and the inevitability of similar
cases arising in the future. Id. at -, 529 A.2d at 410.
45. Id. at - , 529 A.2d at 412. See. e.g., in re President and Directors of Georgetown
College, 331 F.2d 1000, 1008 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964) (recognizing
mother's "responsibility to the community to care for her infant"); Holmes v. Silver Cross
Hosp., 340 F. Supp. 125, 130 (N.D. III. 1972) (father could be required to undergo transfusion
if his refusal would devastate his dependents); John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Heston, 58
N.J. 576, 279 A.2d 670 (1971) (blood transfusion ordered for a pregnant woman).
46. 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977).
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mony indicated that the majority of competent individuals would
have elected to proceed with chemotherapy.4 The court, however,
concluded that for Saikewicz, the chemotherapy would result in con-
siderable physical discomfort which he would not be able to under-
stand because of his severe retardation."'
The Saikewicz court found that the decision to discontinue
treatment in incompetency cases should be made by the courts fol-
lowing consultation with the treating physician and guardian."9 In
contrast, the Quinlan court suggested that the responsibility for
making treatment decisions for incompetents should be distributed
among the patient's family, guardian, physician, and a hospital eth-
ics committee. °
The emergence"' of hospital ethics committees reflects an insti-
tutional response to the problems associated with medical treatment
decisionmaking, particularly for incompetent patients. This phenom-
enon is party attributable to the significant role assigned to the eth-
ics committee by the New Jersey Supreme Court in Quinlan.52 The
composition" and function 54 of ethics committees varies from hospi-
47. Id. at - , 370 N.E.2d at 429.
48. In its opinion the court noted that if chemotherapy were administered Saikewicz
would be "involuntarily immersed in a state of painful suffering, the reason for which he will
never understand." Id. at 750, 370 N.E.2d at 430.
49. Id. at __ , 370 N.E.2d at 432-35. This decision may have been influenced by the
fact that Saikewicz had no family members who were willing to become involved in the pro-
ceedings. See Comment, The Role of the Family in Medical Decisionmaking for Incompetent
Adult Patients: A Historical Perspective and Case Analysis, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 539, 588
(1987).
50. The President's Commission for the study of ethical problems in medicine has sug-
gested that consultation with an ethics committee is particularly important for decisions affect-
ing incompetent patients. See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL
PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO
FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT 5 (1983) [hereinafter PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION
REPORT].
51. A national survey done for the President's Commission revealed that less than one
percent of all hospitals and just 4.3 percent of hospitals with more than 200 beds, currently
have ethics committees. See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 50, at 161. A 1978
Survey of Catholic hospitals found that twenty-seven percent had established medical-moral
committees although it was unclear whether or not they could become involved in actual cases.
Id. at 161 n.124.
52. Id. at 161, citing Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 54, 355 A.2d at 672.
53. The President's Commission found that physicians and clergy are well represented
on existing ethics committees; that hospital administrators, nurses, and attorneys are moder-
ately well represented; and that few committees include social workers and lay people. PRESI-
DENT'S COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 50, at 166.
54. Existing ethics committees appear to perform at least two separate functions. Some
hospitals use ethics committees to set ethical and social policy for the care of critically ill
patients. Others invest the ethics committee with actual decisionmaking power in the manage-
ment and review of cases. Id. at 164. The President's Commission notes that some categories
of life support cases should always be reviewed. It proposes that all decisions for seriously ill
newborns be reviewed by an ethics committee. Id. at 167.
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tal to hospital. The President's Commission recommends that ethics
committee membership be diverse. 5 Use of an ethics committee,
however, raises serious privacy problems, particularly when neither
the patients nor their families are entitled to request or attend com-
mittee meetings."8
The New Jersey Supreme Court recently rendered two signifi-
cant decisions5  that refine the acceptable procedures to be used
when the termination of life-support systems is sought on behalf of
incompetent patients. Both In re Jobes and In re Peter involved a
nursing home patient in a persistent vegetative state.58 In Peter, the
patient had clearly expressed a desire not to be artificially sustained
prior to her incompetency.5 9 Nancy Ellen Jobes, however, did not
execute an advance directive expressing her attitude toward life-sus-
taining treatment. Thus, the Jobes court was forced to determine
which individual may perform the surrogate decisionmaking function
for the incompetent patient and the standard to which this individual
must adhere in making that decision. 0
The nursing home where Mrs. Jobes was being treated refused
to discontinue a jejunostomy tube (an artificial feeding device) on
55. Id. at 166.
56. The majority of the case law concerning the right-to-die issue relies on a patient's
constitutional right to privacy when ordering termination of life-support systems. If medical
treatment decisions are respected by means of this privacy theory, exposing a patient's medical
record to an ethics committee without the patient's consent appears to conflict with the under-
lying premise of the privacy right. Id. at 168. This, in fact, was one aspect of the scathing
critique given of the Quinlan decision by one commentator. See Gelfand, supra notes 20, 29.
57. In re Peter, 108 N.J. 365, 529 A.2d 419 (1987); In re Jobes, 108 N.J. 394, 529 A.2d
434 (1987).
58. Dr. Fred Plum, Professor and Chairman of the Department of Neurology at the
Cornell Medical Center testified as an expert witness for Mrs. Jobes. Dr. Plum is a world
reknowned expert on the persistent vegetative state and the original creator of the term. He is
the author of several treatises explaining it. At trial he explained:
Vegetative state describes a body which is functioning entirely in terms of
its internal controls. It maintains temperature. It maintains heart beat and pul-
monary ventilation. It maintains digestive activity. It maintains reflex activity of
muscles and nerves for low level conditioned responses. But there is no behav-
ioral evidence of either self-awareness or awareness of the surroundings in a
learned manner.
Jobes, 108 N.J. at -, 529 A.2d at 438. See also PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION REPORT, supra
note 50, at 174-75 where it is stated that
[m]ost of what makes someone a distinctive individual is lost when the per-
son is unconscious, especially if he or she will always remain so. Personality,
memory, purposive action, social interaction, sentience, thought, and even emo-
tional states are gone. Only vegetative functions and reflexes persist. If food is
supplied, the digestive system functions and uncontrolled evacuation occurs; the
kidneys produce urine; the heart, lungs, and blood vessels continue to move air
and blood; and nutrients are distributed in the body.
59. 108 N.J. at __ , 529 A.2d at 422.
60. Id. at __ , 529 A.2d at 436.
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moral grounds.6' The Superior Court decision in favor of Mrs. Jobes
was appealed by the nursing home and the New Jersey Public Advo-
cate."' On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that family
members can decline life-sustaining treatment for a non-elderly, non-
hospitalized patient after securing statements from the attending
physician and at least two independent physicians knowledgeable in
neurology verifying that 1) the patient is in a persistent vegetative
state; and 2) there is no reasonable possibility that the patient will
ever return to a cognitive, sapient state." These medical determina-
tions must be based on clear and convincing evidence. 64
The Jobes court identified the substituted judgment approach to
decisionmaking for persistently vegetative patients as its ideal.6 5 It
stated that the family's substituted judgment is preferred because
they are in the best position to know the patient's relevant philosoph-
ical, theological, and ethical values.66 When there are no close family
members and the patient has not designated another person to make
surrogate medical decisions, a guardian must be appointed.67
The substituted judgment doctrine provides one means by which
medical treatment decisions may be made for incompetent patients.
The court in Jobes stated that, ideally, each person should set forth
his or her own intentions regarding life-prolonging medical treat-
ment.6" It also recognized that the legislature is better equipped than
the judiciary to frame comprehensive guidelines and procedures in
this area and urged it to pass legislation.69
61. Id. at -. , 529 A.2d at 437.
62. Lack of an institutionalized adversary to contest the termination decision in incom-
petency cases is regarded as a serious problem. In some cases the prosecutor's office is named a
party when there is a request for declaratory relief and has generally represented the state's
interest in life. After a declaratory judgment is rendered in a given jurisdiction, however, the
prosecutor becomes unnecessary. In subsequent cases, a guardian ad litem is a possible party
for the role, if one is appointed. Gelfand, supra note 20, at 772 n.102. In In re Jane Doe, the
Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas named the Attorney General of Pennsylvania as
a party to the action for the purpose of representing the state's interest. A Regional Chief
Deputy Attorney General advised the court that it would not enter an appearance or lodge any
objection to the court's order. In re Jane Doe, No. 2560, slip op. at 3. The District Attorney
was likewise appointed as a representative of the state's interest but also refused to appear or
be heard because "they are a criminal body that investigates after the fact and would not get
involved in rendering any sort of advisory opinions de facto or otherwise." Id. at 13.
63. 108 N.J. at __ , 529 A.2d at 447-48.
64. Id. at , 529 A.2d at 441. The court stated that evidence is clear and convincing
when it is so clear and direct "as to enable the factfinder to come to a clear conviction, without
hesitancy, of the truth of the precise facts in issue." Id. Accord In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486
A.2d 1209 (1985).
65. 108 N.J. at __ , 529 A.2d at 449.
66. Id. at -' 529 A.2d at 444-45.
67. Id. at __, 529 A.2d at 447.
68. Id. at , 529 A.2d at 451.
69. Id. at -, 529 A.2d at 452.
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Unlike Jobes, in Peter, the patient had executed a durable
power of attorney prior to her incompetency. The power of attorney
authorized her companion to make all decisions with respect to her
health care as if he were her next of kin.70 The Superior Court or-
dered that no medical treatment could be withdrawn without first
obtaining acquiescence from the state Office of the Ombudsman for
the Institutionalized Elderly.71 The state Ombudsman decided that,
although he was convinced that Hilda Peter would not have wanted
to be kept alive by mechanical means in a persistent vegetative state,
he was precluded from consenting to removal of her nasogastric tube
by the court's prior decision in In re Conroy. 2
On appeal, the New Jersey Supreme Court accepted the author-
ization of Ms. Peter's durable power of attorney despite the fact that
it did not specify authority to terminate life-support treatment. In
doing so, the court noted that the goal of decisionmaking for incom-
petent patients should be to determine and effectuate as closely as
possible the decision that the patient would have made if compe-
tent. 73 The court employed the clear and convincing evidence stan-
dard in determining Ms. Peter's intent. It stated that a written ad-
vance directive is the best evidence of a patient's preference about
life-sustaining treatment and suggested the use of a living will.74 In
the absence of a living will, the court accepted a durable power of
attorney as authority for Hilda Peter's companion to request termi-
nation of treatment. The court remarked, however, that it would
have been better if Ms. Peter had specifically provided in her power
of attorney the authority to terminate life-sustaining treatment, as
opposed to simply granting authority to manage and direct her medi-
cal care. 5
In its three most recent decisions7' addressing the right-to-die
issue, the New Jersey Supreme Court has articulated guidelines for
the judiciary to follow when the termination of life-support systems
is sought for terminally ill patients. If the patient is competent, his
or her express wishes should be upheld by virtue of the common law
right to self-determination and constitutional right to privacy.7 In
70. 108 N.J. 365, -, 529 A.2d 419, 422.
71. Id.
72. Id., (citing In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985)).
73. 108 N.J. 365, -, 529 A.2d 419, 423.
74. Id. at __, 529 A.2d at 426.
75. Id.
76. See supra note 42.
77. In re Farrell, 108 N.J. 335, 529 A.2d 404 (1987). This test was also applied by the
court in In re Peter, 108 N.J. 365, 529 A.2d 419 (1987).
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instances of incompetency, if the patient has left clear and convinc-
ing evidence of his or her treatment preference, then the Conroy sub-
jective test78 should be employed and the patient's choice must be
respected. If the incompetent patient's attitude toward life-sustaining
treatment is unclear, then the court should rely on the substituted
judgment procedures established in Quinlan and elaborated in Jobes.
IV. Statutory Enactments
A. Two Legislative Mechanisms to Facilitate Medical Treatment
Decisionmaking - Living Will Laws and Durable Power of Attor-
ney Statutes
State legislatures in thirty-nine jurisdictions79 have enacted stat-
utes authorizing use of the living will 80 to facilitate medical treat-
ment decisionmaking and to alleviate the necessity of court interven-
tion.81 The living will is a written document executed by a legally
78. In In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985) the New Jersey Supreme Court
considered the case of an elderly, incompetent nursing-home resident with severe and perma-
nent mental and physical impairments who had a life expectancy of one year or less. Three
tests were established to determine when a surrogate's decision to decline life-sustaining treat-
ment on behalf of such a patient may be approved:
I) It is clear that the particular patient would have refused the treatment under
the circumstances involved. This is the "subjective" test. Id. at 360, 486 A.2d at
1229.
2) There is some trustworthy evidence that the patient would have refused the
treatment, and the burdens (the pain and suffering) of the patient's continued
life with the treatment markedly outweigh the benefits (any physical pleasure,
emotional enjoyment or intellectual satisfaction) that the patient may still be
able to derive from that life. This is the "limited-objective" test. Id. at 365, 486
A.2d at 1232; or
3) The pain and suffering of the patient's life with the treatment clearly and
markedly outweigh the benefits that the patient derives from life, and the patient
is suffering from so much pain that prolonging his life would be inhuman. This is
the purely "objective" test. Id. at 366, 486 A.2d at 1232.
79. 1987 HANDBOOK, supra note 6, at 28-29.
80. The term "living will" originated in 1967 when a Chicago attorney, Luis Kutner,
addressed a meeting of the Society for the Right to Die. At this meeting, Kutner proposed that
a person, while still of sound mind, draw up a document as a "testament permitting death" in
order to prevent treatment that may be contrary to the patient's will. See generally Kutner,
Due Process of Euthanasia: The Living Will, A Proposal, 44 IND. L.J. 539 (1969).
81. Courts faced with the issue of deciding whether to terminate life-sustaining medical
treatment have repeatedly passed this responsibility to the legislatures. In this regard, the New
Jersey Supreme Court in In re Peter stated:
We recognize, as we did in Conroy, and as have numerous other courts, that
given the fundamental societal questions that must be resolved, the Legislature
is the proper branch of government to set guidelines in this area. But until the
Legislature acts, patients, their families and health care professionals must look
to the courts for the guidelines under which life-sustaining medical treatment
may be withdrawn or withheld.
108 N.J. 365, -, 529 A.2d 419, 429 (1987) (citation omitted).
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competent adult prior to incompetency or terminal illness."2 It con-
stitutes an affirmative directive to medical personnel authorizing the
withdrawal of life-support systems.8 s
The durable power of attorney8" is a second legislative alterna-
tive which provides a mechanism to facilitate medical treatment
decisionmaking. Forty-nine jurisdictions have enacted durable power
of attorney statutes8" which authorize a specified individual to act
for the principal. 81 The majority of this legislation is modeled after
the 1979 Uniform Durable Power of Attorney Act.87 Pennsylvania's
Durable Power of Attorney Act88 authorizes an attorney-in-fact to
admit the principal to a medical facility, to initiate medical treat-
ment, and to authorize medical and surgical procedures.
Although three bills proposing living will legislation89 were in-
troduced in the Pennsylvania General Assembly prior to 1987, none
were enacted.90 In 1987, Senator John Stauffer, et al introduced
Senate Bill 210, entitled the Medical Treatment Decision Act.91 This
proposal is currently pending in the Health and Welfare Committee
82. See Martyn and Jacobs, supra note 24, at 787.
83. Living wills were initially developed as instructional directives without any binding
legal effects. Natural death acts were subsequently enacted to afford legal recognition to living
wills drafted according to certain criteria. The legal status of living wills remains uncertain in
jurisdictions where no legislation exists. Even in the absence of enabling legislation, however,
living wills may serve as evidence of a patient's intent regarding treatment. PRESIDENT'S COM-
MISSION REPORT, supra note 50, at 140-41.
84. "A 'power of attorney' is a document by which one person (the principal) confers
upon another person (the agent) the legally recognized authority to perform certain acts on the
principal's behalf." PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 50, at 146. Traditionally,
the power of attorney was used for managing business property or investment interests without
court intervention. Personal rights such as marrying, voting, or drafting a will generally cannot
be transferred to an attorney-in-fact. Martyn and Jacobs, supra note 24, at 795-96.
85. Martyn and Jacobs, supra note 24, at 786.
86. One barrier to the use of a power of attorney for medical treatment decisionmaking
was that the common law power of attorney automatically terminated when the principal be-
came incapacitated. The durable power of attorney is a statutory creation which resolves this
barrier by allowing the agent's authority to continue after the principal is incapacitated. Id;
see also PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 50, at 146.
87. Martyn and Jacobs, supra note 82, at 786.
88. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5604 (Purdon Supp. 1987).
89. These bills were Senate Bill I 110, entitled Medical Treatment Decision Act; Senate
Bill 1270, entitled Natural Death Act; and H.R. 1487, which was a bill similar in scope to
Senate Bill II 10. Senate Bill II 10 passed the Senate and was referred to the House Health
and Welfare Committee where no action was taken before the legislature adjourned. The other
two bills did not pass in either chamber. In re Jane Doe, No. 2560, slip op. at 18 (Pa. C.P.
Philadelphia County Aug. 26, 1987).
90. Id.
91. The bill was introduced on January 28, 1987 and passed in the Senate on April 28,
1987. Id. See supra note 10. Currently, Senate Bill 210 remains in the subcommittee on health
of the House Health and Welfare Committee which is chaired by Representative Frank Pis-
tella of Allegheny County. No vote is scheduled for the bill at the present time. Telephone
conversation with individual from the House Health and Welfare Committee, Harrisburg, PA
(Apr. 18, 1988).
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of the House of Representatives.
B. Deficiencies in Existing Living Will Legislation
No two statutes enacted since the first Natural Death Act in
197602 are identical, although several have common characteristics. 3
A major deficiency in many statutes is their failure to provide for the
appointment of an agent to make medical treatment decision if the
patient becomes incapacitated.9' In contrast, durable power of attor-
ney statutes do provide a proxy mechanism and may allow patients
greater control over decisionmaking than the instructional directive
authorized by most natural death acts." These statutes, however,
were enacted primarily to avoid the necessity of court intervention in
the management of small property interests.96 Adapting them to the
context of health care decisionmaking may require greater proce-
dural safeguards.9"
Since California's pioneering statute, four prominent deficien-
cies have been detected in natural death legislation." First, use of
the term "imminent" to define the point (when death is imminent)
after which it is appropriate to remove life-sustaining procedures has
been criticized because of its imprecision.' 9 Second, several statutes
require a fourteen-day waiting period after diagnosis of terminal ill-
ness before an advance directive may be implemented. This provision
has been criticized for its failure to account for the special problems
92. California was the first state to statutorily recognize a right to die. Unlike the U.S.
Constitution, the California Constitution specifically protects an individual's right to privacy.
CAL. CONS. art. i, § I. The legislature based its Natural Death Act on this right. CAL. HEALTH
& SAFETY CODE §§ 7185-7195 (West Supp. 1988). See Comment, supra note II, at 112.
Florida has recently enacted an express constitutional provision granting a right to privacy for
all natural persons. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23 (1980). See Martyn and Jacobs, supra note 82, at
785 n.31.
93. Generally, living will legislation provides the following: 1) recognition of an adult
patient's advance directive regarding medical care in the event of a terminal condition; 2)
immunity from legal liability for medical caregivers who honor directives; and 3) a suggested
form for the declaration and definitions of terms and procedures for execution of the declara-
tion. See 1987 HANDBOOK, supra note 6, at 15-16.
94. See infra note 104.
95. See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 50, at 145.
96. Id. at 147.
97. Id. The President's Commission reports that not enough experience has accumulated
in decisionmaking under durable power of attorney statutes in order to determine precisely
which safeguards are necessary. The Commission recommends that existing durable power of
attorney statutes be studied as they are applied to decisionmaking for incompetent patients. Id.
98. See Comment, supra note II, at 125.
99. Id. In order to avoid this imprecision, the Kansas statute simply requires that the
patient be in a "terminal condition" and not that death be imminent. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-
28, 103 (1985). The Handbook of the Society for the Right to Die recognized the Kansas law
as the most effective legislation enacted at that time. Comment, supra note 11, at 122 (citing
1981 HANDBOOK, see supra note 6, at 12).
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of trauma victims who may experience extreme suffering during the
fourteen-day period. 0' A third deficiency detected in existing legisla-
tion is the five-year re-execution requirement. 1' 0 This provision re-
quires the patient to re-execute the living will document every five
years. In cases where a degenerative disease is involved, such a re-
quirement may be unduly restrictive. Finally, a major defect in
many statutes including the California Act,' is their ineffectiveness
when situations involving minor or incompetent patients arise.'
Subsequent enactments have attempted to remedy this deficiency by
including a proxy provision permitting another person to execute a
living will on behalf of minors or incompetents. 104
C. Analysis of the Medical Treatment Decision Act Proposed in
Pennsylvania
Pennsylvania's proposed Medical Treatment Decision Act de-
clares that "[a]ny competent adult may, at any time, execute a dec-
laration directing the initiating, continuing, withholding or with-
drawal of medical treatment in the event the person should have a
terminal condition and be incompetent.' 0 5 Such a declaration must
be signed and dated by the declarant (or by another person in the
declarant's presence at the declarant's express direction) in the pres-
ence of two witnesses. All signatures must be notarized before the
declaration becomes effective.' 06
The Act would not require that death be imminent before an
advance directive may be carried out. Rather, it defines a terminal
condition as "an incurable and irreversible medical condition caused
100. Comment, supra note II, at 125.
101. Id.
102. In an attempt to clarify ambiguities in the original Act, the sponsor of the Califor-
nia Natural Death Act introduced a proposed bill in the 1979-80 legislative session, SB 700
entitled "Self-Determination in Medicine Act." This bill would have repealed the California
Natural Death Act, replacing it with a more liberal statute whereby the terminally ill require-
ment would be eliminated and treatment desires could be communicated to the physician
orally as well as in writing. The bill was not acted upon by the legislature. Comment, supra
note 22, at 196.
103. Id. at 194.
104. For example, North Carolina's statute provides that a directive may be executed by
specified family members on behalf of a terminally ill comatose patient. Yet, New Mexico's
statute requires court certification before a directive may be executed by family members on
behalf of a terminally ill minor. Id. Thirteen of the thirty-nine living will laws enacted to date
have a provision specifically authorizing appointment of a proxy. See SOCIETY FOR THE RIGHT
TO DIE, CHECKLIST CHART OF LIVING WILL LAWS (1987) [hereinafter CHECKLIST] (available
from The Society for the Right to Die, 250 West 57th St., New York, NY 10107).
105. S. 210, Pennsylvania General Assembly, 1987 Sess. § 4(a) [hereinafter Proposed
Act.
106. Id.
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by injury, disease or physical illness which will, in the opinion of the
attending physician, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, re-
sult in death regardless of the continued application of medical treat-
ment, including life-support systems."' ° Pursuant to these provi-
sions, a patient's advance directive may be executed and life-support
systems terminated upon diagnosis of a terminal condition, without
regard to whether death is imminent. Given the difficulty of defining
imminent death, this appears to be an improvement over statutes
which require the imminent death determination before life-support
systems may be removed. 0 8
Likewise, Pennsylvania's proposed Medical Treatment Decision
Act does not include the fourteen-day waiting period which has been
subject to criticism in statutes from other jurisdictions. These provi-
sions require a physician to wait fourteen days after diagnosis of a
terminal illness before the advance directive may be implemented.
Both the imminent death and the fourteen-day waiting period provi-
sions were included in the California Natural Death Act as checks
against abuse of the non-treatment privilege. 10 9 Requiring a patient
to wait at least fourteen days following notification of a terminal ill-
ness before executing a directive" 0 was intended to safeguard
against hasty decisionmaking during a potentially unstable emotional
period. Other statutes require a patient to revalidate his or her direc-
tive after being diagnosed terminally ill."' One commentator notes
that these revalidation requirements often function as an "Achilles
heel" because patients who have drafted directives before becoming
terminally ill seldom remain conscious for fourteen days and are ei-
ther dead or legally incompetent prior to expiration of the waiting
period."'
107. Id. at § 3.
108. Physicians generally agree that death is imminent only when it will occur within a
very short period of time. Accordingly, this restriction spares the patient only a small amount
of unwanted treatment. See Note, The California Natural Death Act: An Empirical Study of
Physicians' Practices, 31 STAN. L. REV. 913, 941 (1979).
109. Id. at 923.
I10. The California Act creates two kinds of advance directives, binding and advisory.
Only an advisory directive may be executed before a patient is diagnosed as terminally ill.
These directives do not compel withdrawal of treatment. Binding directives may be executed
after the person has been informed of his or her terminal illness and are subject to the four-
teen-day waiting period. Id. at 922-23.
111. Texas, Idaho, and Oregon have included this provision in their statutes. Martyn
and Jacobs, supra note 24, at 789-90.
112. Id. at 790. See also Note, supra note 108, at 941. In 1979, a group of Stanford law
and graduate students conducted a survey of physicians, who were members of the Santa
Clara County Medical Society, to empirically determine the effect of the California Natural
Death Act on their treatment of terminally ill patients. Survey results indicated that a sub-
stantial portion of patients die or lapse into unconsciousness during the waiting period and thus
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The proposed Medical Treatment Decision Act does contain a
time limitation of five years after which a declaration must be re-
executed. Criticism aimed at such provisions focuses on the situation
in which an individual may become incompetent within the five year
period and unable to re-execute the document.113 The Pennsylvania
Legislature appears to have alleviated this concern by providing as
follows: "[I]f the declarant becomes incompetent within five years
after the execution of the declaration and remains incompetent at
the time of the determination of a terminal condition as provided by
section 8, the declaration shall continue in effect.""" Furthermore, if
a declaration has expired and the physician proceeds, the legislature
has established a presumption in favor of the expired declaration
which is treated as the express wish of the patient concerning medi-
cal treatment." 5
The ineffectiveness of the declaration in situations involving mi-
nor or incompetent patients is a significant drawback of living will
legislation as originally enacted in California." 6 The inclusion of a
proxy provision, permitting another person to execute treatment de-
cisions on behalf of the minor or incompetent patient, is one means
of alleviating this inadequacy." 7 The proposed Pennsylvania Act ad-
dresses this concern in two different sections.
In section 4(c), the Act provides a form to be followed in exe-
cuting a declaration which may include additional directions includ-
ing "a designation of another person to make the treatment decision
for the declarant should the declarant be diagnosed as suffering from
a terminal condition and be incompetent or otherwise mentally or
physically incapable of communication.""' 8 The same language is
again employed in section 4(d). This section goes on to explain that
such a designee "may not participate in the treatment decision un-
are precluded from making binding directives. Id. at 941. The California Act originally con-
tained a three day waiting period that was extended to fourteen days as a result of political
pressure from the Pro-Life Council. Id. at 923 n.50.
113. See Comment, supra note 1I, at 125.
114. Proposed Act, supra note 105, at 86.
115. Id.
116. See supra notes 102, 104, and accompanying text.
117. Various concerned groups have proposed statutes that effectively combine charac-
teristics of both natural death acts and durable power of attorney statutes in order to alleviate
the inadequacies which each individually possesses. Proposals of particular interest include:
Yale Law School Legislative Services Project, Medical Treatment Decision Act, Society for
the Right to Die, New York (1981); Model Health Care Consent Act (draft), National Con-
ference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Chicago (1982); Uniform Right to Refuse
Treatment Act (draft), Concern for Dying, New York (May 1982); Michigan House Bill 4492
(March 26, 1981). See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 50, at 148.
118. Proposed Act, supra note 105, at 84(c).
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less the patient does not then have and will not regain, to a reasona-
ble degree of medical certainty, the capacity to make decisions for
himself."' 19
By incorporating this language, the legislature presumably is at-
tempting to provide a mechanism for the appointment of a proxy
decisionmaker. This may also be accomplished by means of a gen-
eral durable power of attorney statute. Pennsylvania's durable power
of attorney statute,12 0 however, is not clear as to whether authority
to refuse, as well as authority to consent, to treatment is transferred
to the attorney-in-fact under the statute. 2'
Eleven living will statutes currently provide decisionmaking pro-
cedures for incompetent patients who never executed an advance di-
rective or appointed a proxy decisionmaker. 22 In fact, this exigency
is common and has been involved in nearly all of the major right-to-
die cases. 23 Only two statutes from the first wave of legislation an-
ticipated this circumstance.' 24 By 1984, five additional states, Flor-
ida, Louisiana, Virginia, New Mexico, and Oregon, had provided for
such cases. Of the 1985 enactments, four states (Connecticut, Iowa,
Utah, and Texas by amendment) included this provision in their liv-
ing will laws.' 2 ' Generally, the procedures prescribed involve a list-
ing by priority of people close to the patient who should be consulted
with regard to treatment options.'2
119. Id. at § 4(d).
120. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5604 (Supp. 1987).
121. Medical treatment decisionmaking is similarly authorized by general durable power
of attorney statutes in Colorado and North Carolina. Although neither of these specifically
permit treatment refusal, Colorado's Living Will Act recognizes the authority of a durable
power of attorney for health care by implication. See 1987 HANDBOOK, supra note 6, at 10.
122. Id.
123. Id. See also In re Jobes, 198 N.J. 394, 529 A.2d 434 (1987).
124. Arkansas' 1977 statute and North Carolina's 1977 statute as amended in 1979
provided for this circumstance. See 1987 HANDBOOK, supra note 6, at 10.
125. For citations to these statutes and amendments, see supra note 6.
126. 1987 HANDBOOK, supra note 6, at 10. Of the four statutes enacted in 1985, the
Texas amendment appears to articulate the better-reasoned procedures for cases in which in-
competent adult patients have not executed an advance directive. It provides:
Sec. 4C(a) If an adult qualified patient is comatose, incompetent, or other-
wise mentally or physically incapable of communication, and the person has not
issued a directive under this Act, the attending physician and the legal guardian
of the patient may make a treatment decision that may, based on knowledge of
what the patient would desire, if known, include a decision to withhold or with-
draw life-sustaining procedures from the patient.
(b) If the patient does not have a legal guardian, the attending physician
and at least two, if available, of the following categories of persons, in the fol-
lowing priority, may make a treatment decision that may, based on knowledge of
what the patient would desire, if known, include a decision to withhold or with-
draw life-sustaining procedures:
(1) the patient's spouse;
(2) a majority of the patient's reasonably available adult children;
TERMINATION OF MEDICAL TREATMENT
Pennsylvania's proposed Medical Treatment Decision Act does
not include provisions addressing the situation of incompetent pa-
tients who have never executed an advance directive specifying their
treatment desires. It also fails to address medical decisionmaking
procedures for cases involving minors.127 The proposed Act does
make reference to a power of attorney executed pursuant to the Du-
rable Power of Attorney Act, 128 but limits the legal effect of such
documents to that afforded declarations executed pursuant to the
Medical Treatment Decision Act. 29 Currently, both the proposed
Medical Treatment Decision Act and the Durable Power of Attor-
ney Act are designed to provide guidance only when an advance di-
rective, either a living will or a durable power of attorney, has been
executed by the patient. Accordingly, a large portion of right-to-die
cases may still be decided on common law grounds and constitu-
tional principles despite the efforts of the legislature. One purpose of
the proposed Medical Treatment Decision Act was to avoid judicial
decision of this nature. In order to fulfill this purpose, further legisla-
tive guidance is needed with regard to minors and incompetents, par-
ticularly where an advance directive has never been executed.
A primary function of living will laws is to provide legislative
procedures by which individuals can control the course of their medi-
cal treatment in order to avoid artificially prolonging life by mechan-
ical means. A survey conducted in conjunction with the California
Natural Death Act'3 0 clarifies the meaning of artificial life-sus-
taining procedures. The survey asked doctors what treatments they
considered to be in the category of artificial life-sustaining proce-
(3) the patient's parents; and
(4) the patient's nearest living relative.
(c) A treatment decision made under Subsection (b) of this section must be
made in the presence of at least two witnesses who possess the same qualifica-
tions as are required by Section 3(a) of this Act.
(d) The fact that an adult qualified patient has not issued or executed a
directive does not create a presumption that the patient does not want a treat-
ment decision to be made to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining procedures.
TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4590(h), § 4C (as amended 1985). Because this provision
requires that a treatment decision be based on knowledge of what the patient would desire, if
available, it coincides most closely with the position reached by the judiciary, particularly in
New Jersey. See e.g., In re Jobes, 108 N.J. 394, 529 A.2d 434 (1987); In re Peter, 108 N.J.
365, 529 A.2d 419 (1987).
127. A related topic of concern, from a statutory as well as a judicial standpoint, in-
volves the medical treatment decisionmaking process for severely deformed or permanently
incapacitated newborns. The issue of newborns does not fall within the parameters of this
Comment, however, which primarily focuses on the Medical Treatment Decision Act and the
decisionmaking process for competent and incompetent adults.
128. See supra note 88.
129. Supra note 105, at § 12(d).
130. See Note, supra note 108.
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dures.' 3' Generally, the California doctors agreed that dialysis and
the use of respirators and resuscitators constitute artificial life-sup-
port. There was an even split of opinion, however, regarding intrave-
nous feeding.132 Approximately one-third of the doctors surveyed
considered insulin, antibiotics, or chemotherapy to be "artificial"
devices. 33
Nineteen of the thirty-nine living will laws currently enacted
permit withholding or withdrawing artificial feeding and hydration
devices."3  Twelve others could be interpreted to permit the same.
3 5
Eight states specifically prohibit withholding or withdrawing artifi-
cial feeding and hydration. 36 Recognizing the need for uniformity
among state laws, the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws promulgated a Uniform Rights of the Termi-
nally Ill Act.137 The Uniform Act provides that if nutrition and hy-
dration are not necessary for the patient's comfort or for the allevia-
tion of pain, they may be withdrawn. 3
In contrast, Pennsylvania's proposed Medical Treatment Deci-
131. Id. at 932.
132. Id. at 932 n.90.
133. In defining artificial life-sustaining procedures, the Stanford survey suggested that
treatments are "life-sustaining" if patients can die from failure to receive them and are "artifi-
cial" particularly when they involve mechanical means. As such, antibiotics, chemotherapy,
and insulin would not be classified as artificial. Id.
134. The following is a list of cases that address artificial nutrition and hydration: Ras-
mussen v. Fleming, No. 2 CA-CIV 5622 (Ariz. Ct. App. June 25, 1986); Bouvia v. Superior
Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1986), review denied (Cal. June 5, 1986);
Cantor v. Weiss, No. 626, 163 (Cal. Supp. Los Angeles County Dec. 30, 1986); Barber v.
Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (1983); Inre Rodas, No. 86PR139
(Colo. Jan. 22, 1987); In re Zahn, No. 85-3723 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Nov. 20, 1986); Corbett v.
D'Alessandro, 487 So.2d 368 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), review denied 492 So.2d 368 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1986); Wilcox v. Hawaii, Civ. No. 860116 (Hawaii June 16, 1986); In re Laws, No.
226215 (Mass. Probate Ct. May 4, 1987); Brophy v. New England Sinai Hospital, Inc., 398
Mass. 417, 497 N.E.2d 626 (1986); In re Hier, 18 Mass. App. 200, 464 N.E.2d 959 (1984),
review denied, 392 Mass. 1102, 465 N.E.2d 261 (1984); In re Jobes, 108 N.J. 394, 529 A.2d
434 (1987); In re Requena, 213 N.J. Super. 475, 517 A.2d 886 (1986); In re Clark, 210 N.J.
Super. 548, 510 A.2d 136 (1986); In re Visbeck, 210 N.J. Super. 527, 510 A.2d 125 (1986);
In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985); In re Chelta, No. 1086/87 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Nassau County May I, 1987); Workmen's Circle Home v. Fink, No. 13172/87 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
April 27, 1987); In re Kerr, No. 45188/86 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 7, 1986); In re Vogel, 134
Misc.2d 395, 512 N.Y.S.2d 622 (Sup. Ct. 1986); Delio v. Westchester Co. Medical Center,
134 Misc.2d 206, 510 N.Y.S.2d 415 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1986); In re Plaza Health
and Rehabilitation Center (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 2, 1984); In re Bayer, No. 4131 (N.D. Bur-
leigh County Feb. 5, 11, 1987); Newman v. William Beaumont Army Medical Center, No.
Ep-86-CA-276 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 30, 1986); Hazelton [sic] v. Powhatan Nursing Home, Inc.,
No. CH 98287 (Va. Cir. Ct. Fairfax County Aug. 29, 1986), appeal denied Record No. 86814
(Va. Sept. 2, 1986); In re Guardianship of Grant, No. 52609-5 (Wash. Nov. 29, 1986).
135. CHECKLIST, supra note 104.
136. States prohibiting such action include Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia,
Idaho, Maine, Montana, and Wisconsin. Id.
137. UNIFORM RIGHTS OF TERMINALLY ILL ACT §§ 1-18, 9B U.L.A. 609 (1986).
138. See 1987 HANDBOOK, supra note 6, at 14.
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sion Act takes a stricter position. It provides that nutrition and hy-
dration may not be withheld from a patient unless such nutrition and
hydration could not be physically assimilated by the patient or would
be physically harmful or unreasonably painful to the patient. 13 9 The
Oklahoma legislature has also taken a stricter stance by enacting a
new law placing further restrictions on the removal of artificial feed-
ing and hydration devices. This law, entitled the Hydration and Nu-
trition for Incompetent Patients Act, became effective on November
1, 1987.140 It establishes a presumption that every incompetent pa-
tient has directed his or her physician to provide artificial feeding.
Furthermore, it states that artificial feeding must be provided unless
it is "medically not possible."'' Unless the patient is irreversibly in-
competent, in the final stage of an illness, and facing imminent
death, it also prohibits the Oklahoma courts from entering an order
honoring a request that feeding be stopped.' 2 The Oklahoma legisla-
tion severely restricts the right to refuse treatment and to die in ac-
cordance with personal beliefs.
Like Oklahoma, the position of the Pennsylvania legislation de-
parts from the majority of states which permit removal of artificial
feeding and hydration devices. It seems reasonable to condition the
removal of these devices upon whether the nutrition and hydration
could be physically assimilated by the patient or would be physically
harmful or unreasonably painful to them. In the case of competent
adults, however, the patient should retain ultimate authority for this
decision.
V. Conclusion
The termination of life-prolonging medical treatment raises
complex legal issues. Judicial resolution of right-to-die cases typi-
cally relies on constitutional and common law doctrines which only
139. S. 210, Pennsylvania General Assembly, 1987 Sess. § 13 states as follows:
Nothing in this act shall relieve a person, whether or not he has a terminal
condition, of the right and obligation to receive, or the physician, health care
provider or health care facility of the obligation to provide, nutrition and hydra-
tion except that as to a patient with a terminal condition such nutrition and
hydration may be withheld if it could not be physically assimilated by the pa-
tient or would be physically harmful or unreasonably painful to the patient. Fur-
ther, nothing in this act shall relieve the physician, health care provider or health
care facility of the obligation to provide other measures deemed necessary to
provide comfort to a person or to alleviate his pain regardless of whether a per-
son has a terminal condition.
140. See Concern for Dying Newsletter, Vol. 13, No. 3 at 2 (Fall 1987).
141. Id.
142. Id.
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tenuously supply the authority necessary to sanction the removal of
life-sustaining systems. The preferred method of resolving legal is-
sues associated with medical treatment decisions is through statutory
procedures articulated by the legislatures.
Natural death acts and durable power of attorney statutes pro-
vide two legislative mechanisms by which competent individuals may
designate the course of their medical treatment in the event of termi-
nal illness or incompetency. A durable power of attorney statute ex-
ists in Pennsylvania, and the General Assembly is currently consider-
ing enactment of natural death legislation. Neither set of statutory
provisions anticipates all possible exigencies which may arise.
The proposed Medical Treatment Decision Act avoids many of
the deficiencies detected in acts from other jurisdictions. It does not
provide procedures, however, for resolving treatment decisions in-
volving incompetent patients who have not executed advance direc-
tives. In fact, legislative guidance for medical treatment decision-
making exists in Pennsylvania only when an advance directive, either
a living will or a durable power of attorney, has been executed by
the patient. The majority of cases reaching the high courts in other
jurisdictions have involved incompetent patients who never executed
advance directives. In order to reduce the necessity of court interven-
tion in cases of this type, it is recommended that adequate provisions
for appointment of a proxy decisionmaker are included in the Act.
Patricia A. Wentworth
